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In the last five years, over one-third of a million patents quietly expired for 
lack of maintenance.1  The inventions embodied in those patents represent a 
peculiar balance of resource allocation.  On one hand, that they were patented at 
all suggests these inventions once warranted the development and concretization 
of research, as well as the financing necessary to prosecute and secure patent 
rights.  However, that they subsequently expired for lack of maintenance reveals 
that these inventions were eventually not even worth the relatively modest 
statutory fee needed to keep them in force.2  Sunk investments did not yield 
returns.  Perhaps other, more promising inventions took precedence.  Regardless, 
these inventions are now freely available in the public domain to be practiced 
and improved upon.3 
To understand the significance of the public inheritance of the subjects of 
expired patents, it is useful to understand the nature of that practice and to 
examine a dataset of expired patents for commonality or patterns.  Accordingly, 
this Article presents a dataset of these recently expired patents to characterize 
                                                          
 + Postdoctoral Associate, Duke University School of Law; NIH Center for Public Genomics 
Postdoctoral Associate, Duke Institute for Genome Sciences & Policy; Expert Advisor, United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).  The arguments in this writing are the author’s and 
should not be imputed to the USPTO or any other organization.  Sincere thanks to Roger Ford, 
Kevin Collins, Yaniv Heled, Oskar Liivak, Christina Mulligan, Brenda Simon, and Stephen 
Yelderman for thoughtful comments, and to Michael Carley, David Darwin, and Alan Marco for 
methodological discussions.  Different iterations of this project have benefited from presentation at 
the 13th Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, the 2013 Global Medicine Challenge 
Symposium at Whittier Law School, and PatCon 4: The Patent Conference. 
 1. See infra Figures 1–17. 
 2. See United States Patent and Trademark Office Fee Schedule, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee010114.htm#patapp (last visited Jan. 5, 
2014) (listing patent maintenance fee amounts). 
 3. J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 941 (2011). 
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them, primarily with respect to technology and geography, as well as to compare 
them to recently issued patents as a springboard for rigorous empirical research 
on the evolving balance of innovation in the U.S. economy.  Part I contextualizes 
the value of this new dataset within existing scholarship on the technology- and 
geography-specific dimensions of patenting activity.  Part II explains the 
construction and usage of the dataset, provides descriptive statistics as well as 
some preliminary policy-relevant inferences, and presents an outlook for 
potential future research and analytical refinement enabled by this data. 
I.  THE WHAT AND THE WHERE OF PATENTS 
A.  Technology-Specificity in Patenting 
A live debate persists on whether the U.S. patent system is, and should be (in 
the words of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS)), a truly “unitary system 
with few a priori exclusions.”4  The 2004 NAS Report submitted that it is such 
a system.5  As a result, the report suggested that the U.S. patent system is a strong 
one because a unitary system contributes to flexibility in the service of 
accommodating new technologies—a self-evidently desirable driver of 
innovation.6  As the NAS Report clarifies and critics emphasize, however, even 
a purportedly unitary system is flexible only insofar as it can impose broad 
standard-like criteria in a technology-agnostic manner without the sacrifice of 
rule-like virtues (such as certainty, stability, and security7) that arise from the 
application of those standards in contexts that are often quite technology-
specific.8 
Indeed, as a practical matter, much patent doctrine is technology-specific 
because it premises patentability requirements such as obviousness and 
enablement upon what a person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) 
would have been able to conceive with certain prior knowledge,9 or may 
                                                          
 4. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 42 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter NAS REPORT] (emphasis added). 
 5. See id. at 41. 
 6. Id. (stating that “[a] system granting even temporary monopoly rights to developers of 
one technology but providing no incentives to developers of other, including substitute, 
technologies obviously would be hostile to innovation over the long run”).  If qualitatively obvious, 
however, the actual economic harms to innovation attributable to fragmented monopoly-rights 
regimes, favoring some technologies and industries at the expense of others, remains largely 
unstudied. 
 7. See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 400 (1985) (discussing 
the vices and virtues of rules and standards as a legal dialectic). 
 8. NAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 45–46 (“Notwithstanding its unitary character, the U.S. 
patent system is differentiated in transparent and subtle ways that accommodate differences in 
technologies or that affect technologies differently.”). 
 9. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012) (denying patent protection for inventions that would have 
been obvious to “a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains”). 
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subsequently be able to accomplish with certain teaching.10  This approach of 
applying unitary legal standards to particular technologies, rather than crafting 
disparate technology-specific regimes, can have significant retrospective and 
prospective public policy consequences, particularly with regard to the incentive 
function of patents.11 
Retrospectively, the unitary nature of patentability standards can affect 
whether the patent incentive operates effectively to recoup investments already 
sunk into research and development.12  For example, Professor Jonathan Darrow 
has argued that application of the PHOSITA standard for obviousness suffers 
from an overreliance on defining the supposed level of skill and on delineating 
the scope of relevant prior knowledge against which to judge the invention, 
while neglecting the ordinarily skilled artisan’s perspective within the art.13  He 
traced the history of three major perspectives: the mechanic, a tradesman “who 
practiced his art with ordinary skill but who was not an inventor[;]”14 the 
designer, “whose work required a significant effort of the brain[;]”15 and the 
professional researcher.16  The patent system, he found, has drifted 
inappropriately toward a researcher-based conception of ordinary skill that 
systematically under-rewards innovation in the useful arts by defining the 
relevant art itself in terms of innovative activity.17 
Prospectively, the unitary nature of patentability standards can affect whether, 
and to what extent, institutional reforms in the patent system can successfully 
promote incentive-aligned invention (i.e., invention that would not have come 
about but for the promise of patent protection).18  Thus, evaluating the 
                                                          
 10. See id. at § 112(a) (explaining that patent protection requires a written description 
sufficient to enable the practice of the invention by “any person skilled in the art to which it 
pertains”). 
 11. For a succinct discussion of the incentive function that patents are intended to serve, see 
generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 
266 (1977) (asserting “[t]he patent is a reward that enables the inventor to capture the returns from 
his investment in the invention, returns that would otherwise (absent secrecy) be subject to 
appropriation by others”).  See also KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-
BEARING 152 (Julius Margolis ed., 1971) (identifying “a fundamental paradox in the determination 
of demand for information; its value for the purchaser is not known until he has the information, 
but then he has in effect acquired it without cost”). 
 12. See Jonathan J. Darrow, The Neglected Dimension of Patent Law’s PHOSITA Standard, 
23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 227, 253 (2009) (discussing the importance of patent incentives as a method 
of reducing investment risk). 
 13. See id. at 237–38. 
 14. Id. at 239–40. 
 15. Id. at 242–43. 
 16. Id. at 243–44. 
 17. See id. at 228 (explaining that “[b]ecause patent law is intended to encourage investment 
in activities likely to lead to improvements in an art—that is, research—a conception of the 
PHOSITA as an ‘ordinary researcher’ becomes counterproductive”). 
 18. Daniel R. Cahoy, An Incrementalist Approach to Patent Reform Policy, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. 
& PUB. POL’Y 587, 621–22 (2006). 
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desirability of different aspects of the patent right may require distinguishing the 
availability of particular rights from the extent of those rights; such unitary 
protection encourages or discourages invention differently with respect to 
each.19  In such a framework, extending the scope of patent-eligible subject 
matter may encourage incentive-aligned invention where the patent-eligible 
fields are valuable to society, are in need of investment incentives, and will 
consequently generate innovative activity on an equal basis with other protected 
fields.20  However, it may discourage incentive-aligned invention if one of these 
assumptions fails, particularly when patent protection does not have a significant 
impact on incentives to innovate.21 
Similarly important is the extent of different aspects of the patent right, 
including the breadth of protection that may be claimed, the types of activities 
over which the patent may be asserted, the duration of the right, and the extent 
of disclosure necessary to seal the patent bargain.22  For example, the breadth of 
what may be justified as a “pioneer patent” and its effect on follow-on 
innovation,23 particularly when broad patent rights may be granted early in the 
innovation life cycle to forestall expensive duplication of research,24 differs 
between industries characterized by a significant amount of follow-on 
innovation and those in which cumulative innovation is not the norm.25  The 
impact of a right to exclude without regard for infringer intent,26 albeit a negative 
right with no positive right to practice one’s own invention,27 differs in industries 
                                                          
 19. See id. at 610–21 (discussing how legal attributes contribute to the patent incentive 
structure). 
 20. Id. at 610–11. 
 21. Id. (noting the market may impact the utility of patent incentives). 
 22. Id. at 613. 
 23. Compare Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Marketplace for Ideas?, 84 TEX. L. 
REV. 395, 409–10 (2005) (arguing that patents for pioneering inventions inherently create the risk 
of hold-up with respect to downstream improvements that require access to the original invention), 
with John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 489–90 
(2004) (disputing the patent policy of allowing pioneers to prevent follow-on innovations from free 
riding). 
 24. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 46–47 (5th ed. 1998). 
 25. See Cahoy, supra note 18, at 615–16 (noting the benefits and detriments of prolonged 
patent rights); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 
1619–24 (2003) (illustrating a case study of software as an industry of incremental innovation 
requiring idiosyncratically narrow and short-lived patents). 
 26. Patent infringement as a strict liability tort is commonplace in case law.  See, e.g., Hilton 
Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1995), rev’d 520 U.S. 
17 (1997) (“Intent is not an element of infringement.  A patent owner may exclude others from 
practicing the claimed invention, regardless of whether infringers even know of the patent . . . .”) 
(internal citations omitted).  But see Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its 
Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 800–07 (2002) (framing patent 
infringement as a “modified strict liability” tort in which actual or constructive notice of the patent 
may, indeed, be relevant to the extent of the infringer’s liability). 
 27. See 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 16.02[1] (2014) (explaining that “[a] patent 
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where mutual blocking patents28 carry a greater risk of creating patent thickets 
and in those less characterized by overlapping rights.29  The optimality of a 
twenty-year patent term30 may balance the incentive to innovate with the search 
cost associated with avoiding infringement differently in industries with 
relatively short product life, such as software,31 compared to industries where 
product development and regulatory approval cycles can be quite long, such as 
in the pharmaceutical field.32  Thus, the ideal patent term may vary with the 
useful life of the patented invention.33  Significantly, the sufficiency of a 
                                                          
basically grants to the patentee and his assigns the right to exclude others from making, using, and 
selling the invention” but “does not grant the affirmative right to make, use or sell”). 
 28. The phenomenon of blocking patents arises from the many-to-one relationship that often 
exists between patents and their associated products or services: where separate patents claim 
different aspects of the same invention, each patentee may block the other from fully practicing the 
invention in a commercially meaningful way.  See Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in 
Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 330–35 (2009) (providing a discussion of the conceptual 
role of blocking patents in the view of patents as exclusionary rights). 
 29. See Cahoy, supra note 18, at 616–18 (noting that incentives for property holders in the 
technology industry create overlapping interests); see also Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent 
Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE 
ECONOMY 119, 120 (Adam B. Jaffe et al eds., 2001) (describing patent thickets as a “dense web of 
overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to 
actually commercialize new technology” and explaining that they are an extreme case of the 
commercial impasse that can arise from mutual blocking patents).  Affected industries include 
biotechnology, where a fragmentation of diffusely held patent rights on intellectual resources, such 
as genetic information, may create an anticommons in which product development would impose 
high transaction costs to bundle together all the relevant rights to avoid hold-up.  See Michael A. 
Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical 
Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998) (hypothesizing that today’s upstream biomedical research is 
increasingly likely to become more privatized and supported by private funding, possibly resulting 
in more frequent overlapping patent claims). 
 30. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012) (generally providing, subject to adjustments for undue 
examination delays, that the term of a patent shall expire twenty years from the filing date of the 
earliest application to which the patent claims priority). 
 31. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE 
AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 109 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 FTC REPORT]. 
 32. See id. at 91–92. 
 33. Cahoy, supra note 18, at 618–19 (addressing the pros and cons of a flexible patent law 
system). The economic impacts on innovation of fixed patent terms—and the econometric 
estimation of optimal variable patent terms—have received considerable attention in economic 
literature.  See, e.g., Eric Budish et al., Do Fixed Patent Terms Distort Innovation? Evidence from 
Cancer Clinical Trials, NBER PROGRAM ON PRODUCTIVITY, INNOVATION, & 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 1–2, 5 (2013) (focusing on distortion of research and development under fixed 
patent terms for cancer treatments); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A 
Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1815, 1821–27 (1984) (suggesting a framework for approaching 
the patent-antitrust conflict, defining the optimum patent life from an economic viewpoint); F.M. 
Scherer, Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. 
REV. 422, 423–24 (1972) (extrapolating upon a recent empirical analysis calculating the optimum 
duration of patent protection); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: 
Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 37–38 (1991) (concluding that 
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disclosure—in providing public notice of a patent’s boundaries or in teaching 
the invention to the ordinarily skilled artisan—may vary based on whether, for 
example, the pertinent art employs a standardized vocabulary,34 whether the art 
addresses predictable versus unpredictable natural phenomena,35 or even 
fundamentally whether, in a given art, the appropriability of inventive rewards 
from trade secrecy “outweighs the benefits of patent exclusivity” in the 
invention.36 
In view of these public policy consequences, a growing body of empirical 
scholarship has characterized the differing roles that patents play across 
technologies and industries.  The seminal study of this kind is that of Professors 
Wesley Cohen, Richard Nelson, and John Walsh, finding that firms employ a 
variety of protections for the profits associated with their inventions beyond 
                                                          
social value is not linked to research costs, and as a result, the information used to calculate 
optimum patent length is exclusively available to patent examiners and the courts). 
 34. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 153, 201 (2008) (attributing the 
increased value of patents in the field of chemical structures and compositions in part to concrete 
and standardized boundaries put on patents in those fields, and vice-versa in the case of software 
and semiconductors). One prominent proposed policy response has been to require patent 
applicants to more clearly delineate ex ante the bounds of their claims by, for example, defining 
specialized terms and distinguishing between limitative and illustrative embodiments.  See Peter S. 
Menell, Promoting Patent Claim Clarity 1–2 (Univ. of Berkeley, Research Paper No. 2171287, 
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2171287. 
 35. Construing In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988), the USPTO expressly gauged, 
among several factors, the “predictability . . . of the art” when evaluating whether the applicant has 
sufficiently enabled her invention for purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 112.  See MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE ch. 2164.01(a) (9th ed. 2014).  The relevance of scientific unpredictability 
on technology-specific patentability outcomes came to a head in Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010), in which the court noted two distinct, co-equal 
purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 112: to establish that (1) the inventor possessed the claimed invention, and 
(2) that the inventor adequately taught the ordinarily skilled artisan how to practice the claimed 
invention.  However, commentators have variously emphasized and minimized the relevance of the 
unpredictable arts doctrine following Ariad.  Compare, e.g., Joseph Jakas, Encouraging Further 
Innovation: Ariad v. Eli Lilly and the Written Description Requirement, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1287, 1292 (“For a complex and ever-changing field like biotechnology, the written description 
requirement provides a useful and straightforward tool for courts in determining what invention an 
inventor actually possessed at the time he filed his claim.”), with Greg R. Vetter, Patent Law’s 
Unpredictability Doctrine and the Software Arts, 76 MO. L. REV. 763, 796 (“If undue 
experimentation is understood . . . as . . .  learning effort . . . based on lack of predictability in . . . 
technology, this purpose does not apply in written description[;] . . . the disclosure’s purpose is not 
to provide information to make and use. [It] is to provide information to allow the artisan to 
understand what was invented.”). 
 36. Cahoy, supra note 18, at 619–21 (discussing the benefits of both patent transparency and 
patent secrecy).  For a balanced critique of the largely one-sided preference in contemporary legal 
doctrine and innovation policy for patent-mediated disclosure over trade secrecy, see Anderson, 
supra note 3, at 939–40, 950. 
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applying for patents, including secrecy, first-mover advantage, and 
complementary marketing and manufacturing.37 
More recently, and with specific focus on high technology, Professors Stuart 
Graham, Robert Merges, Pam Samuelson, and Ted Sichelman found in the 2008 
Berkeley Patent Survey that technology startups often seek and own patents in 
ways and for reasons that are industry-specific.38  Further, they found that 
patents, while relatively weak incentives for core innovation activities, confer 
significant competitive advantages in preventing copying, securing capital, and 
enhancing market reputation.39  Further building on the Berkeley Patent Survey, 
Professors Graham and Sichelman have discussed in greater detail the strategic 
use that entrepreneurs and start-up firms make of patents, such as leverage in 
cross-licensing negotiations and signaling in capital markets, particularly in the 
biotechnology and medical device sectors.40 
At the opposing end are arguments against the essentiality of differences 
among industries, both as to their usage of the patent system and with respect to 
the impact of the patent system upon their efficient operation.41  Repudiating 
calls for a “post-unitary patent system,”42 for example, Robert Armitage has 
found an absence of industry-specific differences with respect to the relevant 
criteria for evaluating the merits of a patent system.43  The need to address so-
called industry differences in institutional reform, he argues, instead reflects 
systemic failings that affect certain technology sectors differently or 
negatively—not for any reason inherent to an affected sector, but merely due to 
the nascence of patenting in that sector.44 
                                                          
 37. Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions 
and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 5, 24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 7552, 2000). 
 38. Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results 
of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1283, 1297–99 (2009). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See Ted M. Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical 
Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 179 (2010); Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted M. 
Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063, 1095–96 (2008). 
 41. See, e.g., Robert A. Armitage, The Myth of Inherent and Inevitable-“Industry 
Differences”: “Diversity” as Artifact in the Quest For Patent Reforms, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 401, 403–06 (2007). The agenda of the conference in which Robert Armitage, Senior 
Vice President and General Counsel of Eli Lilly and Company, presented these arguments included, 
in pertinent part, the following discussion topics: How “unitary” is the present patent system as a 
practical matter?;  Through what mechanisms, and how effectively, does the patent adapt to 
different technologies, industries, markets, or innovation practices?;  “At what level and how would 
a ‘post-unitary’ patent system differentiate among economic characteristics and conditions?” See 
id. at 402 (stating that industry differences for patent purposes is unproven). 
 42. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 43. See id. at 404–07 (listing benchmarks of systemic success as well as failure benchmarks 
which, Armitage argues, arise uniformly in intellectual property management strategy, regardless 
of industry sector). 
 44. Id. at 407–12.  But see James Bessen, Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex 
Technologies 3 (Research on Innovation & Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 0401, 
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Lastly, on the basis of this and other empirical evidence have come fully 
normative arguments that the patent system either should, or should not, be 
making economic policy determinations with explicit regard for differences 
among technologies and industries.  For example, Professors Stuart Minor 
Benjamin and Arti Rai have advanced a detailed blueprint for applying 
administrative law principles to the operation of patent law and doctrine.45  Their 
aim was to invigorate judicial review of administrative patent outcomes, 
particularly in the context of a post-grant opposition system in the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), with the goal of improving the quality 
of patents issued by that agency.46  Such procedures have since been enacted 
into law as part of broad reforms in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,47 
including a transitional post-grant review proceeding specific to certain business 
method patents.48 
B.  Geography-Specificity in Patenting 
If discussion of technology-specificity in patents is a live debate, the role of 
geography in patenting is no less storied.  Beginning with the economic work of 
Professors Adam Jaffe, Manuel Trajtenberg, and Rebecca Henderson to find the 
elusive “paper trail by which [knowledge flows] may be measured and 
tracked,”49 the geographic analysis of patent citations has generated considerable 
insight into the broader question of how spillovers from research and 
development affect productivity and economic growth, whether in particular 
industries (such as semiconductors50), in particular economic sectors (such as 
                                                          
2003), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=327760 (arguing that aggressive use of cross-licensing 
affects industries not evenly, but in proportion to industry maturity). 
 45. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent 
System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 335–36 (2007). 
 46. Id. at 270–72. 
 47. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified 
throughout sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 48. See id. at § 18.  The language defining what are, and are not, eligible business method 
patents is starkly industry-specific: “[T]he term ‘covered business method patent’ means a patent 
that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other 
operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service, 
except that the term does not include patents for technological inventions.”  Id. at § 18(d)(1) 
(emphasis added). 
 49. Adam B. Jaffe et al., Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by 
Patent Citations, 108 Q. J. ECON. 577, 578 (1993) (citing PAUL KRUGMAN, GEOGRAPHY AND 
TRADE 53 (1991)).  Professor Jaffe and his co-authors found that patents were significantly more 
likely to cite other patents from the same country, state, and locality (defined by standard 
metropolitan statistical areas) than to cite patents not so localized, suggesting that geographic 
proximity has a strong effect on the magnitude of knowledge spillovers. See id. at 595–96 
(concluding spillovers are geographically localized). 
 50. See, e.g., Paul Almeida, Knowledge Sourcing by Foreign Multinationals: Patent Citation 
Analysis in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 155, 155 (1996) (recognizing 
the concept of “innovative regions”). 
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universities51), or for particular organizational structures (such as parent-
subsidiary corporations and multinationals52). The Jaffe-Trajtenberg-Henderson 
study itself has been subsequently updated with methodological refinements53 
and further discussion.54  The legal literature, too, has explored the geographic 
dimension of patenting at all stages of innovation.55 
Innovative activity itself, for example, tracked patent filings quite well as a 
proxy for invention across geography and over time through the first half-
century of U.S. history and revealed, inter alia, a strong correlation between 
patenting activity and proximity to navigable waterways.56  Similarly, early U.S. 
patent policy showed a preference for greater democratic participation from 
“relatively ordinary individuals” to such an extent that “the rise in patenting was 
associated with a democratic broadening of the ranks of patentees to include 
individuals, occupations, and geographic districts with little previous experience 
in invention.”57 
More contemporarily-oriented research has conversely found that, in highly 
innovative environments, such as Silicon Valley, the fact of geographic 
localization itself is less a driver of innovation than is access to investment 
                                                          
 51. See, e.g., Rebecca Henderson et al., Universities as a Source of Commercial Technology: 
A Detailed Analysis of University Patenting, 1965–1988, 80 REV. ECON. & STAT. 119, 119 (1998) 
(exploring the growth of patents sought by universities). 
 52. See, e.g., Tony S. Frost, The Geographic Sources of Foreign Subsidiaries’ Innovations, 
22 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 101, 102 (2001); Jasjit Singh, Multinational Firms and Knowledge 
Diffusion: Evidence Using Patent Citation Data 3 (INSEAD, Working Paper No. 2004/75/SM, 
2004), available at www.insead.edu/facultyresearch/research/doc.cfm?did=1428. 
 53. Peter Thompson & Melanie Fox-Kean, Patent Citations and the Geography of Knowledge 
Spillovers: A Reassessment: Reply, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 465, 465 (2005) (summarizing a mode of 
reassessment). 
 54. See Rebecca Henderson et al., Patent Citations and the Geography of Knowledge 
Spillovers: A Reassessment: Comment, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 461, 461 (2005) (addressing criticism 
of the authors’ original study); Thompson & Fox-Kean, supra note 53, at 465. 
 55. See Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and 
Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1503, 1536–37 (2012) 
(providing a discussion of spillover in legal literature). 
 56. Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Inventive Activity in Early Industrial America: Evidence from 
Patent Records, 1790-1846, 48 J. ECON. HIST. 813, 813, 817 (1988).  Professor Sokoloff expressly 
draws from more general explorations into the economic history of U.S. industrialization.  See, e.g., 
BROOKE HINDLE, EMULATION AND INVENTION 25 (1981) (citing the steamboat as an early 
example of U.S. patents); BROOKE HINDLE & STEVEN LUBAR, ENGINES OF CHANGE: THE 
AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, 1790–1860 78 (1986) (discussing the initial American 
patent system).  More importantly, however, he also draws methodologically from econometric 
analysis into the level and direction of early inventive activity, particularly as to the systematic use 
of patent data.  See Jacob Schmookler, The Level of Inventive Activity, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 
183, 183–84 (1954) (noting the benefits of reviewing patent data); see also DAVID S. LANDES, THE 
UNBOUND PROMETHEUS: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN 
WESTERN EUROPE FROM 1750 TO THE PRESENT 201 (1969) (citing factors that led to industrial 
expansion). 
 57. B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 
IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790-1920 9 (2005). 
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capital.58  Still, in innovation ecosystems characterized by localized knowledge 
spillovers,59 such as the electric vehicle industry, the impacts of industrial 
agglomeration on R&D investments60 and employment61 suggest that that 
industry will, indeed, cluster geographically.62 
Once granted, patents also receive attention with respect to their transaction 
across geographies.63 The traditional conception of university-to-industry 
technology transfer as a market of discrete exchanges, for example, has given 
way to a model of direct personal relationships with academic inventors—
relationships that are better suited to conveying the necessary, but tacit and 
uncodified, know-how that is associated with the successful exploitation of 
patents.64  Notably, where “technologies are discrete commodities, transaction 
costs are low, and technical disclosure is adequate, patent licensing should not 
correlate with geographic distance. However, contrary to expectation, 
universities do exhibit a notable tendency to license to firms near them.”65  
Beyond technology transfer, direct monetization of patents through licensing in 
the shadow of litigation also has geographic consequences, particularly as to 
taxable patent revenue.66 
There is also a rich literature on the geography of patent disputes, albeit 
derived largely from analyses of forum shopping and its consequences in patent 
                                                          
 58. Tom Nicholas, What Drives Innovation?, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 787, 806–07 (2011) 
(discussing venture capital and private equity).  The supervening importance of venture capital is 
also well-characterized empirically. See, e.g., Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, Assessing the 
Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation, 31 RAND J. ECON. 674, 689–90 (2000). 
 59. See generally Jaffe et al., supra note 49, at 26–27 (discussing evidence that such spillovers 
are geographically localized, but that these locations fade over time). 
 60. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser et al., Growth in Cities, 100 J. POL. ECON. 1126, 1130–32 
(1992) (explaining that geographic clustering among firms, either in the same industry or across 
industries, leads to a positive externality of knowledge spillovers, and that this effect is particularly 
significant in large cities). 
 61. See, e.g., Stefano Breschi & Francesco Lissoni, Localized Knowledge Spillovers Versus 
Innovative Milieux: Knowledge “Tacitness” Reconsidered, 80 PAPERS IN REGIONAL SCI. 255, 
261–62 (2001) (discussing the ways in which knowledge exchange depends on characteristics of 
the particular technology labor market and on the employment structures of locally clustered firms). 
 62. Nicholas, supra note 58, at 806. 
 63. See infra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 64. Lee, supra note 55, at 1537. Professor Lee drew from the empirical literature of 
knowledge flows with a focus on particular clusters, such as Silicon Valley and the Boston Route 
128 Corridor.  See id. at 1536 n.215, 1537 (citing Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of 
High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 575 (1999)); see also Juan Alcácer & Wilbur Chung, Location Strategies 
and Knowledge Spillovers, 53 MGMT. SCI. 760, 760, 765 (2007) (positing that power firms will try 
to locate themselves near universities); David B. Audretsch & Maryann P. Feldman, R&D 
Spillovers and the Geography of Innovation and Production, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 630, 639 (1996) 
(finding areas with higher levels of spillover have increased levels of innovation). 
 65. Lee, supra note 55, at 1536. 
 66. Khurram Naik, For Sale. Patents. Never Used: Gaps in the Tax Code for Patent Sales, 11 
J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 859, 863–64 (2012). 
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litigation,67 which receives additional context from federal litigation of a 
complexity analogous to that of patents68 and litigation generally.69  Two notable 
departures from this literature look past the geography of litigation—even patent 
litigation—to the underlying geography of litigated patents.   
On one side is Judge Moore’s widely cited empirical study examining forum 
shopping.  Judge Moore describes forum shopping as more than an outcome-
driven exercise in estimated win rates, but as a nuanced geographic pursuit of 
judges and juries who are knowledgeable about particular technologies.70  She 
emphasizes that forum shopping has significant consequences for incentives to 
innovate.71  A potential remedy, Judge Moore has argued, is patent specialization 
at the trial court level, without the stringent venue and transfer rules that would 
too widely disperse patent infringement case filings throughout the federal 
judiciary to the detriment of judicial efficiency.72 
In contrast to Judge Moore’s argument is Professor Jeanne Fromer’s study of 
patent disputes, which examines the formation, under permissive venue rules, of 
geographic clusters that are technology-specific with respect to the underlying 
patents.73  Professor Fromer argues that, rather than dispersing patent 
infringement case filings too widely, more restrictive venue and transfer rules 
would instead lead industries to cluster at those particular geographic centers 
where the natural concentration of those industries was already high.74 
                                                          
 67. See, e.g., Scott E. Atkinson et al., The Economics of a Centralized Judiciary: Uniformity, 
Forum Shopping, and the Federal Circuit, 52 J.L. & ECON. 411, 412, 440–41 (2009) (presenting 
econometric comparisons of adjudicative non-uniformity and forum shopping before and after the 
establishment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC)); Jay P. Kesan & 
Gwendolyn G. Ball, Judicial Experience and the Efficiency and Accuracy of Patent Adjudication: 
An Empirical Analysis of the Case for a Specialized Patent Trial Court, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
393, 411–12, 420–22 (2011) (empirically relating the quality of patent adjudication to the degree 
of judicial patent specialization, highlighting the “rampant forum shopping” sought to be 
ameliorated by the 1982 establishment of the CAFC); Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Reconceiving the 
Patent Rocket Docket: An Empirical Study of Infringement Litigation 1985–2010, 11 J. MARSHALL 
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 58, 60 (2011) (proposing a new statistical framework for identifying and 
comparing “patent rocket docket” forums that are commonly targets of forum shopping). 
 68. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Perloff et al., Antitrust Settlements and Trial Outcomes, 78 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 401, 401 (1996) (studying antitrust settlements). 
 69. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evils of Forum 
Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1508–11 (1995) (discussing the trends of venue shopping 
and the consequences the practice may have on litigation). 
 70. Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect 
Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 899, 907, 925 (2001). 
 71. See id. at 927–28. 
 72. Id. at 932, 934, 936.  See also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional 
Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 804–05 (2008) 
(discussing the benefits of judicial patent specialization at the trial court level, as well as of limiting 
amendments to venue and transfer law). 
 73. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1447–49 (2010). 
 74. See id. at 1447 (providing examples, including “the pharmaceutical industry in New 
Jersey and the software industry in Silicon Valley and the Boston and Seattle areas”). 
430 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 64:419 
C.  The Public Domain Gap 
 While strategic acquisition, transaction, and especially litigation of patents 
have been the subject of sophisticated technology-specific and geography-
specific analysis,75 the public domain into which these patents ultimately pass is 
not well characterized along either dimension.  This is not to say that the legal 
literature is silent on the right of the public to freely use the subject matter of 
expired patents.76  Patent case law, too—especially regarding eligible subject 
matter itself—has long guarded against preempting a public domain of “basic 
tools of scientific and technological work.”77  Tools that may be excludable for 
previously being known include expired patents and phenomena or products of 
nature, even if previously unknown.78  Still, specific empirical discussion of the 
contents and implications of the public domain itself is lacking. 
II.  THE EXPIRED PATENTS DATASET 
The expired patents dataset begins to fill this empirical gap by examining 
patents that have expired for failure to pay statutorily required maintenance 
fees.79 
A.  Data and Methodology 
Comprehensive data containing patent maintenance fee and bibliographic 
information on issued patents has been available since 2010 through an 
agreement between the USPTO and Google.80  As of June 2013, the updates to 
information are available through an agreement between the USPTO and Reed 
                                                          
 75. See, e.g., id. at 1493, 1496 (describing a national study of district court patent cases 
consisting of at least one patent claim). 
 76. See, e.g., Perry J. Saidman, Kan TrafFix Kops Katch the Karavan Kopy Kats? Or Beyond 
Functionality: Design Patents are the Key to Unlocking the Trade Dress/Patent Conundrum, 82 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 839, 843 (2000) (arguing that “there is solid, ample precedent for 
the public’s right to copy products in the public domain”); see also TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. 
Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29–30, 35 (2001) (holding that the patentability of the dual-spring 
configuration of TrafFix’s sign stand created a presumption of functionality that counseled against 
trade dress protection, which only extends to distinctive and non-functional aspects of appearance). 
 77. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
 78. See Richard Seth Gipstein, The Isolation and Purification Exception to the General 
Unpatentability of Products of Nature, 4 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2003).  Nor, arguably, 
must these two sets of exceptions be doctrinally coherent with each other “beyond both being 
corollaries of the principle of an inviolable public domain.”  Id. 
 79. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (2012).  All patents that issue from applications that were filed on 
or after December 12, 1980 are subject to three maintenance fees, payable three and a half years, 
seven and a half years, and eleven and a half years from the date of issuance and each with a six-
month grace period.  Id.  Failure to pay these maintenance fees results in the expiration of the patent 
at the end of the grace period: four, eight, or twelve years from issuance, respectively.  Id. 
 80. See Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Teams with Google to 
Provide Bulk Patent & Trademark Data to the Pub. (June 2, 2010), available at 
www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2010/10_22.jsp. 
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Technology and Information Services (RTIS).81  Merging these two data 
sources82 by patent number enabled the construction of a dataset comprising the 
following original variables: 
 patent number; 
 patent application filing date; 
 patent issuance date; 
 patent technology class; 
 patent technology subclass; 
 inventor name; 
 inventor city (for domestic inventors); 
 inventor state (for domestic inventors); 
 inventor zip code (for domestic inventors, if available); 
 country code (for foreign inventors); 
 dates of all maintenance events; and 
 event codes describing all maintenance events.83 
Using the patent technology class, the resulting dataset was matched to the 
Hall-Jaffe-Trajtenberg aggregate technology category and subcategory system 
by concordance to the U.S. Patent Classification system.84  The dataset 
additionally comprised patent age at expiration.  The concordance uniquely 
assigns categories and subcategories to 418 U.S. patent classes, leaving an 
additional ten unassigned U.S. patent classes that were created after the last Hall-
Jaffe-Trajtenberg concordance was developed.  For these remaining U.S. patent 
classes, Hall-Jaffe-Trajtenberg categories and subcategories were manually 
assigned as shown in Table 1. 
The resulting dataset was filtered to keep expiration events—events reflecting 
a failure to pay the maintenance fee—that took place between January 1, 2008 
                                                          
 81. Reed Technology Announces Launch of USPTO Public Data Dissemination Site, 
Expansion of Reed Tech Patent Advisor Service, BUS.WIRE, http://www.businesswire.com/news/ 
home/20130620005234/en/Reed-Technology-Announces-Launch-USPTO-Public-Data#.VKxPgt-
yRPwI (last updated June 20, 2013, 11:50 AM). 
 82. See USPTO Bulk Downloads: Patent Grant Bibliographic Data, GOOGLE, 
www.google.com/googlebooks/uspto-patents-grants-biblio.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2014); USPTO 
Bulk Downloads: Patent Maintenance Fees, GOOGLE,  www.google.com/googlebooks/uspto-
patents-maintenance-fees.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2014). 
 83. See U.S. Patent Grant Maintenance Fee Events File, GOOGLE 1-11 (Dec. 2009), available 
at-storage.googleapis.com/patents/maint_fee_events/current/MaintFeeEventsFileDocumentation-
.doc.  For documentation explaining the country codes, specifically, see Country Codes, USPTO 
PAT. FULL-TEXT & IMAGE DATABASE, www.uspto.gov/patft/help/helpctry.htm (last updated July 
31, 2014). 
 84. See generally Bronwyn H. Hall et al., The NBER Patent Citations Data File: Lessons, 
Insights and Methodological Tools 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8498, 
2001).  See also The NBER U.S. Patent Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights, and Methodological 
Tools, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES., http://www.nber.org/patents/ (last updated May 16, 2012) 
(providing the category and subcategory definitions, as well as the concordance). 
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and December 31, 2012.  Descriptive statistics were then generated for this final 
dataset. 
B.  Discussion 
Overall, the mean age of patents that expired during each month in the five-
year observation window was stable at 8.18 years (coefficient of variation = 
4.4%), coinciding with the second maintenance fee payment. 
Segmented by Hall-Jaffe-Trajtenberg technology category, the mean 
expiration age of patents ranged from 7.5 to 9 years as shown in Figure 1.  
Among expiring cohorts, “Computers and Communications” patents were 
consistently the youngest at expiration, followed by “Electrical and Electronic.”  
Older still at expiration were “Mechanical” and “Other” patents, which generally 
tracked and intersected one another’s trends.  Finally, “Chemical” and “Drugs 
and Medical” patents were the oldest at expiration. 
Notably, beginning around August 2009, the mean age of expiring patents in 
all categories rose together, peaked around March 2010, and fell together until 
June 2010.  Figure 2 summarizes these trends.  At the mean, the estimated 
months in which each of these expiration cohorts had previously issued are  
shown in Table 2. 
Similarly, starting around June 2011, the mean age of patents in all categories 
rose together, peaked around January 2012, and fell together until June 2012.  
Figure 3 summarizes these trends.  Table 3 illustrates the estimated months in 
which each of these expiration cohorts previously issued. 
Figure 4 confirms these trends by an alternate visualization, using the mean 
patent age of each monthly expiration cohort to estimate the mean month in 
which that cohort of patents had issued.  Just as each of the two time periods 
described in Figures 2 and 3 and Tables 2 and 3 correspond in Figure 1 with a 
rise and a fall in mean expiration age, so also do these two time periods 
correspond in Figure 4 with the contractions identified within the otherwise 
linear time lag between issuance and expiration. 
These breaks from the otherwise stable issuance-expiration lag suggest prior 
bursts of issuance activity roughly eight years prior to each rise in the mean 
expiration age.  Figure 5 confirms this intuition, showing a marked rise in patent 
issuances during each of the two prior issuance time periods estimated in Tables 
2 and 3, respectively. 
Segmented geographically by U.S. state, the mean expiration age of patents 
ranged from 6.5 years to 9.5 years, as shown in Figure 6.85  Among expiring 
cohorts, Idaho and Vermont patents were consistently the youngest, while Iowa 
and New Hampshire patents were largely the oldest.  Interestingly, patents from 
Oklahoma were, by turns, among the youngest at expiration (January 2010–May 
                                                          
 85. This analysis looked at those U.S. states with the highest total numbers of patent 
expirations during 2008–2012.  The top thirty-four such states each claimed at least 1,000 patent 
expirations as determined by the home state of the first-named inventors of the patented inventions. 
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2010) and among the oldest at expiration (August 2012–November 2012).  
Figure 7 revisualizes these trends using the mean patent age of each monthly 
expiration cohort to estimate the mean month in which that patent cohort issued. 
Moreover, unlike technology segmentation, which showed similar time trends 
with a higher or lower mean patent age at expiration, geographic segmentation 
appears to show a stable mean patent age of approximately eight years while 
differing by state in its variation from the mean.  Thus, as shown in Figure 8, 
those U.S. states with higher five-year totals in patent expirations showed 
markedly lower variation in the number of expired patents per month than did 
those states with lower five-year totals. 
Segmented geographically by foreign country,86 the mean expiration age of 
patents ranged from four years to ten years, as shown in Figure 9.  Among 
expiring cohorts, patents from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong were consistently 
the youngest, while patents from no single country were consistently the oldest.  
Figure 10 revisualizes these trends using the mean patent age of each monthly 
expiration cohort to estimate the mean month in which that cohort of patents 
issued. 
Again, unlike technology segmentation, which showed similar time trends 
with a higher or lower mean patent age at expiration but in a manner similar to 
geographic segmentation by U.S. state, geographic segmentation by foreign 
country appears to show a stable mean patent age of about eight years while 
differing by foreign country in the variation from the mean.  The three countries 
identified as consistently having the youngest patents in each monthly expiration 
cohort, however—China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong—are, by definition, 
exceptions to this trend, as shown in Figures 7 and 8.  Thus, as shown in Figure 
11, those foreign countries with higher five-year totals in patent expirations 
showed markedly lower variation in the number of expired patents per month 
than did those with lower five-year totals. 
Cross-segmentation allows comparison of geographic sectors by technology.  
Figure 12-1 shows the number of expired patents per Hall-Jaffe-Trajtenberg 
technology category by U.S. state.  Figure 12-2 shows the same as a stacked bar 
chart.  Figure 12-3 shows the percentage share of each state’s patent expirations 
across the six Hall-Jaffe-Trajtenberg technology categories. 
Because the U.S. states in Figure 12-1 are shown in descending order of five-
year total expirations, patents expiring uniformly across technology would 
reveal a monotonically decreasing distribution from left to right.  However, this 
is not the case.  A disproportionately high number of expirations from Texas, for 
example, were “Computers and Communications” patents.  The same was true 
of Michigan with respect to “Mechanical” patents, and Massachusetts and 
Maryland with regard to “Drugs & Medical” patents. 
                                                          
 86. This analysis looked only at those foreign countries with the highest total numbers of 
patent expirations during 2008–2012.  The top twenty such states each had attributed to them at 
least 800 patent expirations as determined by the home country of the first-named inventor. 
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Figure 12-2 substantiates these trends as percentage shares of patent 
expirations across Hall-Jaffe-Trajtenberg technology categories for each state.  
Whereas patents expiring uniformly across technology would reveal roughly 
equal shares of 16.7% within each Hall-Jaffe-Trajtenberg technology category, 
“Computers and Communications” patents accounted for 29.9% of expirations 
from Texas, and “Mechanical” patents accounted for 39.1% of expirations from 
Michigan.  Similarly, “Drugs & Medical” patents accounted for 30.7% of patent 
expirations in Massachusetts and 33.7% of patent expirations in Maryland. 
These findings track conventional wisdom regarding Texas as a hub of 
computer and communications technology;87 Michigan as, historically (and 
again in recent years), a center of mechanical, particularly automotive, 
technology;88 and Massachusetts and Maryland as centers of biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals.89 
Finally, examining similar bibliographic information on newly granted 
patents during the same time period allows direct comparison between 
inventions that are entering the domain of patent protection and inventions that 
are leaving protection for the public domain, a useful comparison across 
technologies and of particular importance to geographic spillovers.  Figures 14-
1 and 14-2 show this comparison across U.S. states ordered decreasingly by 
expirations and grants, respectively. Figures 14-3 and 14-4 show it across 
                                                          
 87. See, e.g., Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 
717, 723 (2010) (discussing the rise of Austin, Texas, as a center of high-technology, patterned in 
part after centrally planned innovation hubs, such as North Carolina’s Research Triangle Park and 
in part after organic start-up-driven growth centers like Silicon Valley).  Professor Ibrahim credits 
Austin’s planned growth largely to Teledyne founder George Kozmetsky, the so-called “father of 
Austin high technology,” and the city’s organic growth to start-up firms, including Dell Computer 
and venture capital firms like Austin Ventures.  Id. at 723 & n.18. 
 88. See, e.g., Jennifer Bradley & Bruce Katz, The One Building that Explains How Detroit 
Could Come Back: A Plan to Foster Innovation Amidst Bankruptcy, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 28, 
2013),-www.newrepublic.com/article/114447/one-building-explains-how-detroit-could-come-
back. 
 89. See generally ROSS DEVOL ET AL., AMERICA’S BIOTECH AND LIFE SCIENCE CLUSTERS 
32–33-(2004),-available-at-http://assets1c.milkeninstitute.org/assets/Publication/Research 
Report/PDF/biotech_clusters.pdf (citing Boston’s second-place rank for biotech innovations).  
Specifically regarding Massachusetts, see Jarunee Wonglimpiyarat, Boston Route 128 Revisited, 2 
INT’L J. INNOVATION & TECH. MGMT. 217, 221–22 (2005) (discussing the transformation during 
the 1990s and onward of Boston’s Route 128 corridor into a hub of biotechnology innovation and 
knowledge transfer from a previous focus on mini-computer and microprocessor technology), and 
Gilson, supra note 64, at 588–89 (describing the structural origins of the Route 128 corridor’s 
ecosystem of university-industry collaboration as a product of post-World War II and Cold War 
federal investment in the cultivation of a technically skilled workforce and of a so-called 
“agglomeration economy”). With specific regard to Maryland, see SHELDON KRIMSKY, 
BIOTECHNICS & SOCIETY: THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL GENETICS 35–36 (1991) (noting that during 
the early 1990s, half of biotechnology firms in the United States located themselves at a handful of 
geographic centers, including Maryland), and Alison Peck, Leveling the Playing Field in GMO Risk 
Assessment: Importers, Exporters and the Limits of Science, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 241, 265 (2010) 
(attributing this early geographic positioning to proximity with major bioscience research 
universities). 
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foreign countries, similarly ordered decreasingly by expirations and grants, 
respectively. 
As with the previously discussed cross-segment comparison of geographic 
sectors by technology, the descending order of patent expirations across U.S. 
states in Figure 14-1 and across foreign countries in Figure 14-3 suggests that 
commensurate rates of patent grants would reveal a monotonically decreasing 
distribution from left to right across the same states and countries.  This is not 
the case, however, as a number of U.S. states accounted for patent grants 
markedly exceeding their incidence of patent expiration; notably, these include 
Texas, Massachusetts, and Washington, as demonstrated in Figure 14-1.  
Foreign countries with similar trends, as illustrated by Figure 14-3, include 
South Korea, Canada, and China. 
Conversely, the descending order of patent grants across U.S. states in Figure 
14-2 and across foreign countries in Figure 14-4 suggests that commensurate 
rates of patent expiration would reveal a monotonically decreasing distribution 
from left to right across the same states and countries.  This, too, is not the case, 
and a number of U.S. states accounted for patent expirations markedly higher 
than their incidence of patent grants; these notably include Michigan, 
Pennsylvania, and Ohio, as shown in Figure 14-2.  Foreign countries with similar 
trends include Taiwan, France, and the U.K., illustrated by Figure 14-4. 
The economic significance of these grant-to-expiration comparisons resides 
in the value of patent grants and expirations as indicators of economic growth 
and decline,90 though the reliability of these indicators remains the subject of 
active debate.91  Indeed, as analogous trends across technology categories reveal, 
the relative scale of patent grants and expirations can be instructive as to the 
economic forces at work. 
As Figure 15 shows, patent expirations during 2008–2012 remained fairly 
stable at around 1,000 per month, albeit with discernible differences among 
categories, particularly “Drugs and Medical” as the lowest.  By contrast, Figure 
16 shows patent grants during the same period diverging sharply across 
technology categories, particularly “Computers & Communications” patents, 
which nearly doubled from over 4,000 per month in mid-2008 to approximately 
8,000 per month by the end of 2012.  Similarly, “Electrical & Electronic” patents 
rose by half from nearly 3,000 per month in mid-2008 to approximately 4,500 
by the end of 2012. Monthly patent grants in the other four categories, 
meanwhile, started between 1,000 and 2,000 per month in mid-2008 and rose to 
no more than approximately 2,500 per month by the end of 2012. 
                                                          
 90. See JONATHAN ROTHWELL ET AL., PATENTING PROSPERITY: INVENTION AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS METROPOLITAN AREAS 14–15 (2013), available 
at-www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2013/02/patenting%20prosperity%20roth 
well/patenting%20prosperity%20rothwell.pdf (providing a detailed, geographically segmented 
analysis of invention and patenting as a driver of regional economic performance). 
 91. See ZVI GRILICHES, R&D AND PRODUCTIVITY: THE ECONOMETRIC EVIDENCE 321 
(1998), available at http://papers.nber.org/books/gril98-1. 
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Thus, even in 2008, the magnitude of grants for “Computers & 
Communications” and “Electrical & Electronic” patents were already out of 
reach of these technology categories’ respective rates of expirations by three-to-
fourfold, and only rose further while expirations remained stable.  Thus, as 
Figure 17 confirms, the rate of patent expirations per month were a fraction of 
patent grants during the same month, which showed only a modest overall 
decline. 
Nevertheless, the rates of grants for patents in the other four technology 
categories started in 2008 at a scale much closer to that of these categories’ 
respective rates of expiration, approximately double at most and lower in some 
cases.  Thus, as Figure 17 further shows, the rate of patent expirations per month, 
as a fraction of patent grants during the same month, was markedly more volatile 
in its decline among these slower-granting technology categories. 
Yet across technologies, the relative stability of expirations per month 
suggests that the changing throughput of old inventions lapsing into the public 
domain as new inventions enter into patent protection may not necessarily be the 
result of patent owners more keenly maintaining their existing rights.  Rather, it 
may result from a large influx of new rights with recent vintage that have largely  
not yet reached a potential expiration event.  In Figure 16, the structural break 
toward rising patent grants appears to have begun in January 2010, meaning that 
the first opportunities for these patents to expire arrived in 2014, or will arrive 
later. 
Whether they do expire, or instead prove valuable enough to maintain, 
transact, or litigate, will implicate persistent and important systemic questions 
regarding patent examination quality and the economic efficiency of the patent 
system. 
C.  Further Research 
To answer these questions in an informed and defensible way, further detailed 
empirical research is required.  Accordingly, the data presented here is 
particularly amenable to matching with related patent data forthcoming from the 
USPTO and other sources. 
Among these is the examination history of applications that have led to issued 
patents, currently available on an individual basis from the USPTO’s Patent 
Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system.92  Thus, matching in bulk the 
expiration data of patents with earlier prosecution events of particular interest, 
may, on one hand, reveal significant or predictive relationships between 
                                                          
 92. Patent Application Information Retrieval, USPTO.GOV, portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2014).  In addition to the Public PAIR system, which provides prosecution 
history information on pending applications and issued patents, the USPTO also provides the 
Private PAIR system by which registered filers may access Public PAIR information as well as 
real-time status information, application documents, and transaction history for their own pending 
patent applications. Private PAIR: Quick Start Guide, USPTO 1–2 (Oct. 2009), 
www.uspto.gov/patents/process/status/private_pair/PrivPairOverview_Oct09.pdf. 
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examination events and applicant behavior, and the likelihood of expiration on 
the other.  Examination events of interest may include use by examiners of 
restriction93 and use by applicants of continuation practice94 or administrative 
appeal following a final rejection.95  Relatedly, applicant behavior of interest 
may include the amendment or cancellation of claims or legal counterargument 
in response to non-final rejections based on various insufficiencies in 
patentability, such as anticipation, obviousness, indefiniteness, and non-
enablement.96 
Conversely, the assertion of patents in litigation is also likely correlated with 
incidences of the expiration and maintenance of patents.  As recent empirical 
research shows, whether litigation arises around particular patents is often a 
complex product of the intrinsic and after-acquired qualities of the patents at 
issue,97 notwithstanding market actors’ subjective appetite for risk in the 
outcomes of patent litigation.98  Notably, Professor Colleen Chien has found that 
                                                          
 93. Multiple independent and distinct inventions claimed in a single application may be 
required to be restricted to one of the inventions, with any remaining inventions becoming the 
subject of divisional applications.  See 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2012) (authorizing restriction and division); 
37 C.F.R. §§ 1.141, 1.142 (2012) (regulating the treatment of different inventions in a single 
national application); MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE ch. 800 (9th ed. 2014) 
(describing USPTO restriction practice). 
 94. Applications subject to final rejection by the USPTO may receive continued examination 
with or without amendment, though no new matter may be introduced into the disclosure of the 
invention.  See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (authorizing continued examination following a final rejection); 
37 C.F.R. § 1.114 (regulating conditions and limitations on requests for continued examination); 
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE ch. 706.07(h) (9th ed. 2014) (describing USPTO 
continued examination practice). 
 95. Rather than seeking continued examination after final rejection by the USPTO, an 
applicant may appeal the examiner’s decision to the USPTO Patent Trial and Appeal Board 
(formerly the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences).  See 35 U.S.C. § 134 (authorizing appeal 
within the USPTO following a final rejection); 37 C.F.R. § 41.64 (regulating ex parte 
administrative appeals of final rejections); MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE ch. 1200 
(9th ed. 2014) (describing USPTO appeals practice). 
 96. The decision to amend or cancel claims, make legal or factual counter-arguments, or 
employ a mixed approach in response to an examiner rejection is a question of considerable 
strategic importance because amendments and arguments employed to reach a finding of 
patentability create estoppel against construing claims too broadly after issuance.  See Festo Corp. 
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 734–35 (2002). 
 97. See Alan C. Marco & Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Certain Patents, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 
103, 107–12 (2013) (discussing litigation as a decision point in the innovation cycle and sampling 
the empirical legal literature regarding the qualities of patents that render them more likely to 
emerge in litigation). 
 98. See Damon C. Andrews, Why Patentees Litigate, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 219, 
248–51 (2011) (proposing that litigation costs and risk diminish the value of patent remedies, such 
as damages and injunctions, so patentees often plan for settlement before investing too heavily in 
litigation).  See also Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why “Bad” Patents Survive in the Market 
and How Should We Change?—The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61, 68–
69 (2006) (quantitatively comparing the costs and risk of litigation between plaintiffs and 
defendants and concluding that risk aversion can allow even demonstrably invalid patents to persist 
in the market). 
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post-issuance investment in patents—including, in her model, the payment of 
maintenance fees—is correlated with a higher incidence of litigation,99 though 
the robustness of these findings has invited divergent discussion regarding 
source data and methodology.100  Moreover, literature suggests that intrinsic 
patent qualities generated during examination and characteristic of the patent 
from issuance, such as the number of claims, the number of backward citations 
to prior art, and the number of jurisdictions in which patent protection is 
concurrently sought, tends to correlate with patent value,101 which can also drive 
litigation.102  It remains a relatively open proposition, however, that the after-
acquired qualities of a patent, such as the number of forward citations to that 
patent in subsequent patents, the post-issuance investment in the patent, and any 
securitization of the patent, tend to correlate with value.  If these qualities 
correlate with a patent’s value, then the relationship among the after-acquired 
traits of patents, the determinacy of patent value, and the incidence of patent 
litigation may be endogenous; this may require further disentanglement of cause 
from effect.  For that analysis, matching patent expiration data with litigation 
data from sources such as the Lex Machina103 or Thomson Derwent LitAlert104 
databases may contribute meaningfully. 
Addressing the question of patent ownership may be helpful for a range of 
research questions pertaining to the uses, potential abuses, and lapses of patents 
into the public domain.  By granting access to existing data, the USPTO provides 
a searchable online query system through its Assignments on the Web 
interface.105 The quality of the underlying assignment and ownership 
information, however, requires improvement,106 particularly with respect to 
patents that may be held by so-called patent-assertion entities.107 
                                                          
 99. Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283, 304–06, 316–17, 
320–21 (2011). 
 100. Jay P. Kesan et al., Paving The Path to Accurately Predicting Legal Outcomes: A 
Comment on Professor Chien’s Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 97, 991–
02 (2012). 
 101. See Dietmar Harhoff, Frederic M. Scherer & Katrin Vopel, Citations, Family Size, 
Opposition and the Value of Patent Rights, 32 RES. POL’Y 1343, 1350–52 (2003). 
 102. See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 439–443 (2004) (arguing 
that the probability of litigation over a patent is a legitimate proxy for the value of the patent). 
 103. LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com (last visited Jan. 7, 2014). 
 104. Database: LITALERT, STNEASY, https://stneasy.cas.org/dbss/help.LITALERT.html 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2014). 
 105. Assignment Search, USPTO.GOV, assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2014). 
 106. See, e.g., 2011 FTC REPORT, supra note 31, 129–31 (discussing the importance of 
ascertaining clear patent ownership to the economically efficient clearance of freedom to operate). 
 107. Id. at 74–81, 90–92.  The 2011 FTC Report identifies search costs and clarity in the 
ownership record—apart from claim boundaries and claim construction issues—as distinct 
inefficiencies in adequately fulfilling the notice function of the patent system, and finds that the 
resulting market opacity can aggravate the effects of patent assertion entity activity.  Id. 
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To this end, the USPTO has been gathering public commentary on potential 
mechanisms for improving the recordation of patent assignments since 
November 2011.108  In June 2013, the USPTO was tasked with developing a 
notice of proposed rulemaking to require patent applicants and owners to 
regularly update ownership information at specified times.109  As these official 
efforts create greater transparency and more detailed information regarding 
patent ownership, matching such information to comprehensive data on patent 
usage outcomes will be a valuable step for scholarly legal analysis of the patent 
system. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The central contribution of this paper, and the anticipated value of this new 
dataset of expired patents and its preliminary descriptive analysis, is to invite 
and enable more detailed research into the balance of innovation in the United 
States.  Demands on Congress, the federal courts, and the USPTO to strike 
increasingly nuanced policy balances and ensure that the patent system does not 
hamper innovation or create economic inefficiency continue to grow.110   The 
public commons to which all innovative activity must ultimately flow is an 
important reference point by which to gauge the successes and failures of policy-
relevant research, yet the nature of that commons remains to be better 
characterized. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 108. See Notice of Roundtable on Proposed Requirements for Recordation of Real-Party-in-
Interest Information  Throughout Application Pendency and Patent Term, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,385, 
70,385–89 (Nov. 26, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 3); Request for Comments on Eliciting 
More Complete Patent Assignment Information, 76 Fed. Reg. 72,372, 72,372–74 (Nov. 23, 2011).  
See also Roundtable on Proposed Requirements for Recordation of Real-Party-in-Interest 
Information, USPTO.GOV, www.uspto.gov/ip/officechiefecon/roundtable_01-11-2013.jsp (last 
updated June 10, 2013) (listing the full text of public comments and testimony received through 
these information collections). 
 109. This USPTO rulemaking is in accordance with the widely publicized White House Task 
Force on High-Tech Patent Issues, which issued seven legislative priorities and five executive 
actions for improving innovation incentives in the U.S. economy.  See Press Release, The White 
House, FACT SHEET: White House Task Force on High-Tech Patent Issues (June 4, 2013), 
available at www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-
high-tech-patent-issues. 
 110. See id. (exemplifying the desire to encourage innovation, and thus, to stimulate the U.S. 
economy). 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1.  Manual Concordance of Unassigned U.S. Patent Classes 
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Figure 1.  Mean Age of Expiring Patents by Technology Category (2008–
2012) (six-month moving average) 
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Figure 2.  Average Age of Expiring Patents During 2009–2010 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Mean Issue Month of Expiring Patents During 2009–2010 
 
Category Aug. 2009 Mar. 2010 June 2010 
Cmp&Cmm Dec. 01 June 02 Aug. 02 
Elec Oct. 01 Mar. 02 July 02 
Mech Aug. 01 Dec. 01 May 02 
Others Sep. 01 Dec. 01 May 02 
Chemical Apr. 01 June 01 Nov. 01 
Drgs&Med Apr. 01 July 01 Jan. 02 
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Figure 3.  Average Age of Expiring Patents During 2011–2012 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Mean Issue Month of Expiring Patents During 2011–2012 
 
Category June 2011 Jan. 2012 June 2012 
Cmp&Cmm Aug. 03 Aug. 03 June 04 
Elec July 03 July 03 Mar. 04 
Mech May 03 May 03 Jan. 04 
Others May 03 Mar. 03 Dec. 03 
Chemical Nov. 02 Feb. 03 Dec. 03 
Drgs&Med Jan. 03 Jan. 03 Oct. 03 
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Figure 4.  Mean Issue Month of Expiring Patents by Technology Category 
(2008–2012) (six-month moving average) 
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Figure 5.  Monthly Issuances of Patents That Eventually Expired During 
2008–2012 
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Figure 6.  Mean Age of Expiring Patents by U.S. State (2008–2012) (six-
month moving average) 
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Figure 7.  Mean Issue Month of Expiring Patents by U.S. State (2008–
2012) (six-month moving average) 
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Figure 8.  Variation from Mean Patent Age at Expiration for States with the 
Highest 5-Year Total Patent Expirations 
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Figure 9.  Mean Age of Expiring Patents by Foreign Country (2008–2012) 
(six-month moving average) 
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Figure 10.  Mean Issue Month of Expiring Patents by Foreign Country 
(2008–2012) (six-month moving average) 
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Figure 11.  Variation from Mean Patent Age at Expiration for Foreign 
Countries with the Highest 5-Year Total Patent Expirations 
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Figure 12-1.  Patent Expirations by U.S. State Across Technologies (2008–
2012) (six-month moving average) 
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Figure 12-2.  Patent Expirations by U.S. State Across Technologies (2008–
2012), Percentage per HJT Category 
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Figure 13.  Patent Expirations by Foreign Country Across Technology 
Categories (2008–2012) (six-month moving average) 
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Figure 14-1.  Patent Grants and Expirations Across U.S. States (2008–
2012):  Decreasing by Expirations (six-month moving average) 
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Figure 14-2.  Patent Grants and Expirations Across U.S. States (2008–
2012):  Decreasing by Grants (six-month moving average) 
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Figure 14-3.  Patent Grants and Expirations Across Foreign Countries 
(2008–2012) 
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Figure 14-4.  Patent Grants and Expirations Across Foreign Countries 
(2008–2012) (six-month moving average) 
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Figure 15.  Patent Expirations by Technology Category (2008–2012) (six-
month moving average) 
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Figure 16.  Patent Grants by Technology Category (2008–2012) (six-month 
moving average) 
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Figure 17.  Patent Expirations as a Proportion of Grants by Technology 
(2008–2012) (six-month moving average) 
 
 
 
